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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PREF](#) [MARR](#) [KPKO](#) [PREF](#) [UN](#) [EU](#)
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SUBJECT: FORMIN FAKI SAYS GOC SEEKS BIGGER UN
ROLE IN CHAD TO SUPPLEMENT DAKAR ACCORD PROCESS
AND CONTROL BORDER

REF: NDJAMENA 276

CLASSIFIED BY AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS
1.4(B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

¶1. (C) FORMIN Faki told Ambassador July 14 that although Chad was committed to the Dakar Accord process, the GOC was becoming less confident in the "practicability" of implementation of the process's key piece -- military observers along the Chad-Sudan borders to identify violations by government forces or rebel groups of that frontier. Faki described current Contact Group (CG) planning as "unrealistic" because it would require too many personnel, could lead to violence between Chad and Sudan armed forces, lacked a reasonable deployment calendar, and was far too costly for the CG to manage.

¶2. (C) Faki said that given the limitations of the Dakar Process, Chad now sought a broader mandate for the UN and EU PKOs in eastern Chad and in Darfur, as Chad had advocated at the recent CEMAC summit, which had called for expansion of the mandates of EUFOR, MINURCAT and UNAMID. The GOC was in favor of an expansion of MINURCAT's mandate to give it more responsibility for "securing" the Chad-Sudan border, including by mounting border observation and "controle." Faki confirmed that the GOC was not opposed "a priori" to MINURCAT "becoming" the follow-on force to EUFOR and offered that expansion of MINURCAT's mandate could be sold to CG member states by giving them the opportunity to contribute personnel to the modified UN mission.

¶3. (C) It appears that the GOC is prepared in principle to embrace the kind of expansion of MINURCAT's mandate that SRSG Angelo advocates (RFTEL) and that would provide a follow-on UN PKO to replace EUFOR. Faki's description of the GOC's willingness to deal with rebels does not include the distinction between chiefs and foot soldiers that other senior GOC officials have drawn. END SUMMARY.

¶4. (C) New FORMIN Faki. Ambassador called on FORMIN Moussa Faki Mahamat July 14. They discussed Chad-Sudan relations, the Dakar Accord

Process, the expansion of MINURCAT's mandate and the GOC's position on dealing with Chadian rebels still in the field in Sudan. Ambassador congratulated Faki on GOC decision to name Ahmet Allam-Mi as its new Permanent Representative to the UN.

15. (C) Dakar Process. Faki said that although Chad was committed to the Dakar Accord process, the GOC was less confident of the practicability of implementation of the key piece of the process - military observers along the Chad-Sudan borders to identify violations by rebel groups of that frontier. Faki said he had recently completed a 15-country round of visits to capitals to counter Sudanese propaganda and explain Chad's position. Faki said he would leave July 15 for Dakar for the next meeting of the Contact Group to implement the March Dakar Accord.

16. (C) Defects in the Dakar Process. Faki said that Chad had been pushing for Sudan to be represented at the FORMIN level and that the Senegalese Government had joined in urging Khartoum to raise the level of its representative above the MFS Secretary General level, at which level Sudan had been represented at previous Contact Group meetings. Faki said that the Experts Group had met and made some progress. But the GOC was afraid that the Contact Group lacked both the financial resources and the technical expertise to mount a successful border

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observation operation as ambitious as the one foreseen at Dakar.

17. (C) The Dakar Process "Unrealistic." Faki said that the idea currently being worked on was "unrealistic" because it would require ten border posts with two observers each, protected by 1,000 Chadian and 1,000 Sudanese soldiers in mixed contingents. He said Chad was suggesting reducing the numbers of the "protection forces" to 150-200 on each side, to lessen the chances of possible fighting between the two sides. The Contact Group did not yet have a calendar for the deployment of the border observers, although deployment must be made no later than the end of October/beginning of November, when the rainy season ended in eastern Chad. Money was another issue. He estimated that the operation, complete with three aircraft and basing and housing of personnel, would cost usdols 30 million per year. Only Libya was ready to spend money and even Tripoli was talking of contributing usdols two million of that total.

18. (C) Broader Mandates for EUFOR and MINURCAT. Faki said that the limitations of the Dakar Process had led the Chadians to seek a broader mandate for the UN and EU PKOs in eastern Chad and in Darfur. Faki said that Chad's initiative at the recent CEMAC summit had resulted in that body's call for an expansion of the mandates of EUFOR, MINURCAT and UNAMID. Faki said that the GOC was in favor of an expansion of MINURCAT's mandate to give it more responsibility for "securing" the Chad-Sudan border, including by mounting border observation and "controle." In response to a direct question, Faki said that the GOC was not opposed "a priori" to MINURCAT "becoming" the follow-on force to EUFOR after the latter's mandate expires in March 2009. Faki noted that the idea of a follow-on force has always been part of the PKO mission in eastern

Chad and figures in the UNSC resolution. Faki said that expansion of MINURCAT's mandate could be made more palatable to CG member states by giving them the opportunity to contribute troops, observers, police and cadre to the expanded UN mission.

19. (C) GOC Policy Toward Rebels. Faki said that as far as the GOC was concerned the 2007 Sirte Accord was still in effect. That meant that any Chadian rebel who laid down arms and renounced violence as a political means could return to Chad. In response to a direct question, he said that this applied to all rebels - leaders and followers alike, with no exceptions. Faki said that the GOC would try to pay some expenses of returned rebels, would try to find them jobs, and would certainly permit them to enter the political field in Chad, as long as they did so peacefully and in accordance with the electoral reform process now being implemented under the August 13, 2007 N'Djamena Accord.

COMMENT

110. (C) It appears increasingly likely that the GOC is prepared in principle to embrace the kind of expansion of MINURCAT's mandate that SRSG Angelo advocates (REFTEL) and that would supply a follow-on UN PKO to replace EUFOR. Faki's remarks fit a pattern. Former FORMIN Allam-Mi told me two weeks ago that there was no fixed position in the GOC opposing a follow-on force. The GOC organ Le Progres yesterday front-paged Chad's agreement with the CEMAC call for "enlarging" the mandates of MMINURCAT, EUFOR and UNAMID. It is unlikely that SRSG Angelo would have retailed his plan for a beefed up, semi-military MINURCAT able to do EUFOR's job if he did not have some confidence in GOC acceptance of his ideas. Faki's description of the GOC's willingness to

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deal with rebels does not include the distinction between chiefs and foot soldiers that other senior GOC officials have drawn.

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